A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

一种基于纳什议价解的自组网时隙分配策略

自组网中的分布式多节点资源分配问题为NP完全问题,一般采用启发式算法进行协议设计,缺少严格的数学证明.基于博弈与纳什议价解理论,提出了一种分布式动态时隙分配策略,并通过严格的数学推导,证明了自组网中不同节点之间的时隙竞争问题存在纳什议价解,为自组网中分布式动态时分多址信道访问控制协议的设计提供了理论依据.     

干扰方式选择方法的研究

为实现对雷达的有效干扰,应选择最佳干扰方式。将干扰效能分为干扰效果和干扰效率2个方面,并对这2方面进行了定量描述,提出了新的干扰效能评估算法,建立了雷达对抗策略矩阵,在此基础上运用对策论的相关原理,研究了干扰方式的选择问题,最后结合实例进行了检验。结果表明,该方法可以有效得出最佳干扰方式。     

一类多时滞泛函微分方程周期正解的存在性

利用非线性泛函分析中半序Banach空间的锥理论和不动点指数方法,得到了一类多时滞泛函微分方程周期正解存在性的充分性条件。     

Network routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis framework

Problems in counterterrorism and corporate competition have prompted research that attempts to combine statistical risk analysis with game theory in ways that support practical decision making. This article applies these methods of adversarial risk analysis to the problem of selecting a route through a network in which an opponent chooses vertices for ambush. The motivating application is convoy routing across a road network when there may be improvised explosive devices and imperfect intelligence about their locations. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Allocating capacity in parallel queues to improve their resilience to deliberate attack

We develop models that lend insight into how to design systems that enjoy economies of scale in their operating costs, when those systems will subsequently face disruptions from accidents, acts of nature, or an intentional attack from a well‐informed attacker. The systems are modeled as parallel M/M/1 queues, and the key question is how to allocate service capacity among the queues to make the system resilient to worst‐case disruptions. We formulate this problem as a three‐level sequential game of perfect information between a defender and a hypothetical attacker. The optimal allocation of service capacity to queues depends on the type of attack one is facing. We distinguish between deterministic incremental attacks, where some, but not all, of the capacity of each attacked queue is knocked out, and zero‐one random‐outcome (ZORO) attacks, where the outcome is random and either all capacity at an attacked queue is knocked out or none is. There are differences in the way one should design systems in the face of incremental or ZORO attacks. For incremental attacks it is best to concentrate capacity. For ZORO attacks the optimal allocation is more complex, typically, but not always, involving spreading the service capacity out somewhat among the servers. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

具有策略偏好的模糊双矩阵对策模型及其应用

针对局中人对策略有偏好、支付值模糊的双矩阵对策给出了一种具体的求解方法,首先根据加权算子集结得到局中人的策略偏好向量、利用模糊数排序方式将模型转化为清晰的双矩阵对策,再利用粒子群优化算法求解.最后以雷达电子对抗为例,建立了具有策略偏好的模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型,研究结果对于双方资源分配,提高作战效能具有一定的军...     

可分椭圆型偏微分方程的 FACR(L)算法及其并行实现

文中就解Dirichlet 边界条件的Poisson 方程给出了FACR(L)算法及其并行实现过程,讨论了FACR(L)算法的计算复杂性,给出了针对向量机YH—1的算法的参数L 的优选公式,在YH—1机上得到了较为理想的,数值试验结果。